Households

In this section, we describe what is arguably the most important economic agent in the OG-Core model: the household. We model households in OG-Core rather than individuals, because we want to abstract from the concepts of gender, marital status, and number of children. Furthermore, the household is the usual unit of account in tax data. Because OG-Core is primarily a fiscal policy model, it is advantageous to have the most granular unit of account be the household.

Household Consumption

We describe the derivation and dynamics of the population distribution in the Demographics chapter in this documentation and in more detail in the calibration chapter on demographics in the country-specific repository documentation. A measure \(\omega_{1,t}\) of households is born each period, become economically relevant at age \(s=E+1\) if they survive to that age, and live for up to \(E+S\) periods (\(S\) economically active periods), with the population of age-\(s\) individuals in period \(t\) being \(\omega_{s,t}\). Let the age of a household be indexed by \(s = \{1,2,...E+S\}\).

At birth, each household age \(s=1\) is randomly assigned one of \(J\) ability groups, indexed by \(j\). Let \(\lambda_j\) represent the fraction of individuals in each ability group, such that \(\sum_j\lambda_j=1\). Note that this implies that the distribution across ability types in each age is given by \(\boldsymbol{\lambda}=[\lambda_1,\lambda_2,...\lambda_J]\). Once an household is born and assigned to an ability type, it remains that ability type for its entire lifetime. This is deterministic ability heterogeneity as described in the calibration chapter on the lifetime earnings process in the country-specific repository documentation. Let \(e_{j,s}>0\) be a matrix of ability-levels such that an individual of ability type \(j\) will have lifetime abilities of \([e_{j,1},e_{j,2},...e_{j,E+S}]\).

Individuals in this economy choose how much to work each period \(n_{j,s,t}\) and how much to consume among \(I\) different consumption goods \(c_{i,j,s,t}\). We assume that households aggregate these industry-specific consumption goods in their preferences into a composite consumption good \(c_{j,s,t}\) every period in every individual’s preferences according to the following Stone-Geary version of a Cobb-Douglas consumption aggregator,

(10)\[ c_{j,s,t} \equiv \prod_{i=1}^I \left(c_{i,j,s,t} - c_{min,i}\right)^{\alpha_i} \quad\forall j,s,t \quad\text{with}\quad \sum_{i=1}^I\alpha_i=1\]

where \(c_{min,i}\) is the minimum consumption of good \(i\) allowed.[1]

Assume that the non-normalized price of each individual consumption good is \(\tilde{p}_{i,t}\). We can solve for the optimal good-\(i\) consumption demands \(c_{i,j,s,t}\) as a function of composite consumption \(c_{j,s,t}\) by minimizing the total after-tax expenditure on consumption given that individual consumption adds up to composite consumption according to (10). Letting \(\tau^{c}_{i,t}\) represent the consumption tax rate on goods of type \(i\), the Lagrangian for this expenditure minimization problem is the following.

(11)\[ \mathcal{L} = \sum_{i=1}^I (1 + \tau^{c}_{i,t})\tilde{p}_{i,t}c_{i,j,s,t} + \lambda_{j,s,t}\Bigl[c_{j,s,t} - \prod_{i=1}^I \left(c_{i,j,s,t} - c_{min,i}\right)^{\alpha_i}\Bigr] \quad\forall j,s,t\]

Because the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint \(\lambda_{j,s,t}\) represents the shadow price of an extra unit of composite consumption, we can relabel it as the price of composite consumption \(\tilde{p}_{j,s,t}\).

(12)\[ \mathcal{L} = \sum_{i=1}^I(1 + \tau^{c}_{i,t}) \tilde{p}_{i,t}c_{i,j,s,t} + \tilde{p}_{j,s,t}\Bigl[c_{j,s,t} - \prod_{i=1}^I \left(c_{i,j,s,t} - c_{min,i}\right)^{\alpha_i}\Bigr] \quad\forall j,s,t\]

Note that the price of composite consumption in period \(t\) can be different for each ability-\(j\) and age-\(s\) individual at this point.

The \(I+1\) first order conditions of this constrained minimization problem are the following \(i\) first order conditions (13) plus the composite consumption aggregator (10).[2]

(13)\[ (1 + \tau^{c}_{i,t})\tilde{p}_{i,t} = \alpha_i \tilde{p}_{j,s,t}\left(\frac{c_{j,s,t}}{c_{i,j,s,t} - c_{min,i}}\right) \quad\forall i,j,s,t\]

Solving (13) for \(c_{i,j,s,t}\) gives the optimal demand function for consumption of good \(i\) by ability-\(j\) and age-\(s\) individual in period \(t\).

(14)\[ c_{i,j,s,t} = \alpha_i\left(\frac{[1 + \tau^{c}_{i,t}]\tilde{p}_{i,t}}{\tilde{p}_{j,s,t}}\right)^{-1}c_{j,s,t} + c_{min,i} \quad\forall i,j,s,t\]

This household demand function for good-\(i\) shows that \(c_{i,j,s,t}\) is a fraction of total composite consumption \(c_{j,s,t}\), and that fraction is negatively correlated with the relative price of good-\(i\) to the composite good price.

Substituting the demand equations (14) back into the composite consumption definition (10) gives us the expression for the non-normalized composite price \(\tilde{p}_{j,s,t}\) as a function of each non-normalized industry-\(i\) good price \(\tilde{p}_{i,t}\).

(15)\[ \tilde{p}_{j,s,t} = \prod_{i=1}^I\left(\frac{[1 + \tau^{c}_{i,t}]\tilde{p}_{i,t}}{\alpha_i}\right)^{\alpha_i} \quad\forall j,s,t\]

Because nothing on the right-hand-side of (15) is a function of \(j\) or \(s\), then \(\tilde{p}_{j,s,t}=\tilde{p}_t\) for all \(j\) and \(s\).

(16)\[ \tilde{p}_{t} = \prod_{i=1}^I\left(\frac{[1 + \tau^{c}_{i,t}]\tilde{p}_{i,t}}{\alpha_i}\right)^{\alpha_i} \quad\forall t\]

Consumption goods are determined from production goods through a fixed \(I\times M\) coefficient matrix, \(\Pi^I\). Each element, \(\pi_{i,m}\), of \(\Pi^I\) represents the fraction of good \(i\) that is made up of output from industry \(m\). It follows that the prices of consumption goods can be expressed as a function of the prices of production goods and the fixed coefficient matrix \(\Pi^I\).

(17)\[ \tilde{p}_{i,t} = \sum_{m=1}^M \pi_{i,m}\tilde{p}_{m,t} \quad\forall i,t\]

We assume that the production good in industry \(M\) is the numeraire.[3] We can normalize the composite consumption price \(\tilde{p}_t\) and the remaining \(M-1\) output goods prices \(\tilde{p}_{m,t}\) for \(m=1,2,...M-1\) in every period \(t\) by dividing all the equations with prices by the industry-\(M\) price \(\tilde{p}_{M,t}\). Similarly, we can divide through all the consumption good prices in every period, \(\tilde{p}_{i,t}\) for \(i=1,2,...I\) and rewrite the optimal consumption demand (14) and composite price index (16) equations as the following functions of normalized prices,

(18)\[ p_{i,t} = \sum_{m=1}^M \pi_{i,m}p_{m,t} \quad\forall i,t\]

(19)\[ c_{i,j,s,t} = \alpha_i\left(\frac{[1 + \tau^{c}_{i,t}]p_{i,t}}{p_t}\right)^{-1}c_{j,s,t} + c_{min,i} \quad\forall m,j,s,t\]

(20)\[ p_t = \prod_{i=1}^I\left(\frac{[1 + \tau^{c}_{i,t}]p_{i,t}}{\alpha_i}\right)^{\alpha_i} \quad\forall t\]

(21)\[\begin{split} \text{where}\quad &p_{m,t} \equiv \frac{\tilde{p}_{m,t}}{\tilde{p}_{M,t}} \quad\forall m, t \quad\Rightarrow\quad p_{M,t} = 1 \quad\forall t \\ \quad\text{and}\quad &p_{i,t} \equiv \frac{\tilde{p}_{i,t}}{\tilde{p}_{M,t}} \quad\forall i, t \quad\text{and}\quad p_t \equiv\frac{\tilde{p}_t}{\tilde{p}_{M,t}} \quad\forall t\end{split}\]

where \(p_{i,t}\) and \(p_t\) defined in (21) are normalized consumption goods prices and normalized composite goods price, respectively, with the \(M\)th industry good being the numeraire.

Budget Constraint

Because the household’s industry-specific demand problem from Section Household Consumption is characterized by equations (10), (19), and (20) is determined by functions of composite consumption \(c_{j,s,t}\) and normalized industry prices \(p_t\) and \(p_{i,t}\), we can write the individual’s utility maximization in terms of composite consumption \(c_{j,s,t}\). An ability-\(j\) and age-\(s\) individual faces the following per-period budget constraint.

(22)\[\begin{split} p_t c_{j,s,t} + &\sum_{i=1}^I (1 + \tau^{c}_{i,t})p_{i,t}c_{min,i} + b_{j,s+1,t+1} = \\ &(1 + r_{p,t})b_{j,s,t} + w_t e_{j,s} n_{j,s,t} ... \\ &\quad\quad + bq_{j,s,t} + rm_{j,s,t} + tr_{j,s,t} + ubi_{j,s,t} + pension_{j,s,t} - tax_{j,s,t} \\ &\quad\quad\forall j,t\quad\text{and}\quad E+1\leq s\leq E+S \quad\text{where}\quad b_{j,E+1,t}=0\end{split}\]

where \(c_{j,s,t}\) is consumption, \(b_{j,s+1,t+1}\) is savings for the next period, \(r_{p,t}\) is the normalized interest rate (return) on household savings invested in the financial intermediary, \(b_{j,s,t}\) is current period wealth (savings from last period), \(w_t\) is the normalized wage, and \(n_{j,s,t}\) is labor supply. Equations (108) and (109) of Chapter Financial Intermediary show how the rate of return from the financial intermediary \(r_{p,t}\) might differ from the marginal product of capital \(r_t\) and from the interest rate the government pays \(r_{gov,t}\). Note that we must add in the cost of minimum consumption \(c_{min,i}\) for all \(i\) because that amount is subtracted out of composite consumption in (10).

The last six terms on the right-hand-side of the budget constraint (22) have to do with dfferent types of transfers to households: bequests \(bq_{j,s,t}\), remittances \(rm_{j,s,t}\), government transfers \(tr_{j,s,t}\), universal basic income \(ubi_{j,s,t}\), public pension benefits \(pension_{j,s,t}\), and net taxes \(tax_{j,s,t}\). The first four types of transfers to households are detailed in the section below entitled Transfers to household.

The third term \(bq_{j,s,t}\) on the right-hand-side of the budget constraint (22) represents the portion of total bequests \(BQ_t\) that go to the age-\(s\), income-group-\(j\) household. Section Bequests details how total bequests are distributed among the different households. The next term on the right-hand-side of the budget constraint (22) represents remittances received by the household \(rm_{j,s,t}\). We describe these remittances in Section Remittances below.

The next term is government transfers \(tr_{j,s,t}\) to households of lifetime income group \(j\) in age \(s\) at time \(t\). Section Government transfers details how total government transfers to households are distributed among the differenty household types. The term \(ubi_{j,s,t}\) the time series of a matrix of universal basic income (UBI) transfers by lifetime income group \(j\) and age group \(s\) in each period \(t\). There is a specification where the time series of this matrix is stationary (growth adjusted) and a specification in which it’s stationary value is going to zero in the limit (non-growth-adjusted). The calibration chapter on UBI in the country-specific repository documentation describes the exact way in which this matrix is calibrated from the values of five parameters, household composition data, and OG-Core’s demographics. Similar to the transfers term \(TR_{t}\), the UBI transfers will not be distortionary.

Government pension systems are modeled explicitly and enter the budget through the \(pension_{j,s,t}\) term. The rules and parameters of the available public pension rules and parameters are in the Pensions section of chapter Government. The term \(tax_{j,s,t}\) is the total tax liability of the household in terms of the numeraire good. This term can include means tested benefit programs. In contrast to government transfers \(tr_{j,s,t}\), tax liability can be a function of labor income \((x_{j,s,t}\equiv w_t e_{j,s}n_{j,s,t})\) and capital income \((y_{j,s,t}\equiv r_{p,t} b_{j,s,t})\) and wealth, \(b_{j,s,t}\). The tax liability can, therefore, be a distortionary influence on household decisions. It becomes valuable to represent total tax liability as the sum of an effective income tax rate \(\tau^{etr,xy}_{s,t}\) function multiplied by total income plus an effective tax rate on wealth \(\tau^{etr,w}_{s,t}\) multiplied by wealth,

(23)\[ tax_{j,s,t} = \tau^{etr,xy}_{s,t}(x_{j,s,t}, y_{j,s,t})\left(x_{j,s,t} + y_{j,s,t}\right) + \tau^{etr,w}_{s,t}\left(b_{j,s,t}\right)b_{j,s,t} \quad\forall j,s,t\]

where the effective income tax rate on labor and capital income can be a function of both labor income and capital income, respectively, \(\tau^{etr,xy}_{s,t}(x_{j,s,t},y_{j,s,t})\), and the effective tax rate on wealth is given by the functional form described in Section Wealth taxes. The calibration chapter on the microsimulation model and tax function estimation in the country-specific repository documentation details exactly how the model estimates the income tax functions from microsimulation model data.

Elliptical Disutility of Labor Supply

In OG-Core, the period utility function of each household is a function of consumption \(c_{j,s,t}\), savings \(b_{j,s+1,t+1}\), and labor supply \(n_{j,s,t}\).[4] We detail this utility function, its justification, and functional form in Section Optimality Conditions. With endogenous labor supply \(n_{j,s,t}\), we must specify how labor enters an agent’s utility function and what are the constraints. Assume that each household is endowed with a measure of time \(\tilde{l}\) each period that it can choose to spend as either labor \(n_{j,s,t}\in[0,\tilde{l}]\) or leisure \(l_{j,s,t}\in[0,\tilde{l}]\).

(24)\[n_{j,s,t} + l_{j,s,t} = \tilde{l} \quad\forall s, t\]

The functional form for the utility of leisure or the disutility of labor supply has important implications for the computational tractability of the model. One difference of the household’s labor supply decision \(n_{j,s,t}\) from the consumption decision \(c_{j,s,t}\) is that the consumption decision only has a lower bound \(c_{j,s,t}\geq 0\) whereas the labor supply decision has both upper and lower bounds \(n_{j,s,t}\in[0,\tilde{l}]\). [Evans and Phillips, 2017] show that many of the traditional functional forms for the disutility of labor—Cobb-Douglas, constant Frisch elasticty, constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)—do not have Inada conditions on both the upper and lower bounds of labor supply. To solve these in a heterogeneous agent model would require occasionally binding constraints, which is a notoriously difficult computational problem.

Show code cell source Hide code cell source

import ogcore.parameter_plots as pp
from ogcore import Specifications
p = Specifications()
p.update_specifications({'frisch': 0.6})
fig = pp.plot_elliptical_u(p)

Fig. 1 Comparison of CFE marginal disutility of leisure \(\theta=0.4\) to fitted elliptical utility

[Evans and Phillips, 2017] propose using an equation for an ellipse to match the disutility of labor supply to whatever traditional functional form one wants. Our preferred specification in OG-Core is to fit an elliptical disutility of labor supply function to approximate a linearly separable constant Frisch elasticity (CFE) functional form. Let \(v(n)\) be a general disutility of labor function. A CFE disutility of labor function is the following,

(25)\[v(n) \equiv \frac{n^{1+\frac{1}{\theta}}}{1+\frac{1}{\theta}}, \quad\theta > 0\]

where \(\theta>0\) represents the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The elliptical disutility of labor supply functional form is the following,

(26)\[v(n) = -b\left[1 - \left(\frac{n}{\tilde{l}}\right)^\upsilon\right]^{\frac{1}{\upsilon}}, \quad b,\upsilon>0\]

where \(b>0\) is a scale parameter and \(\upsilon>0\) is a curvature parameter. This functional form satisfies both \(v'(n)>0\) and \(v''(n)>0\) for all \(n\in(0,1)\). Further, it has Inada conditions at both the upper and lower bounds of labor supply \(\lim_{n\rightarrow 0}v'(n) = 0\) and \(\lim_{n\rightarrow \tilde{l}}v'(n) = -\infty\).

Because it is the marginal disutility of labor supply that matters for household decision making, we want to choose the parameters of the elliptical disutility of labor supply function \((b,\upsilon)\) so that the elliptical marginal utilities match the marginal utilities of the CFE disutility of labor supply. Figure Fig. 1 shows the fit of marginal utilities for a Frisch elasticity of \(\theta=0.9\) and a total time endowment of \(\tilde{l}=1.0\). The estimated elliptical utility parameters in this case are \(b=0.527\) and \(\upsilon=1.497\).[5]

Transfers to household

The household budget constraint (22) includes four terms that represent different types of transfers to households: bequests \(bq_{j,s,t}\), remittances \(rm_{j,s,t}\), government transfers \(tr_{j,s,t}\), and universal basic income \(ubi_{j,s,t}\). These four types of household transfers are detailed in the following subsections.

Bequests

OG-Core allows for two parameterizations of the distribution of bequests. Users can choose the bequest transmission process through two parameters: use_zeta and zeta.

If use_zeta=False, then bequests from households of lifetime earnings type j are distributed equally across households of type j,

(27)\[ bq_{j,s,t} = \frac{BQ_{j,t}}{\lambda_j \omega_{s,t}}\]

where \(BQ_{j,t}\) is the total amount of bequests from the deceased in lifetime income group \(j\). Note that the sum of all the \(BQ_{j,t}\) equals aggregate bequests \(BQ_t\) from equation (123).

(28)\[ BQ_{j,t} \equiv (1+r_{p,t})\lambda_j\left(\sum_{s=E+2}^{E+S+1}\rho_{s-1}\omega_{s-1,t-1}b_{j,s,t}\right) \quad\forall j,t\]

If use_zeta=True, then in the distribution of bequests across age and lifetime ability is determined by \(\zeta_{j,s,t}\), which allocates aggregate bequests across households by age and lifetime income group:

(29)\[\begin{split} \begin{split} bq_{j,s,t} &= \zeta_{j,s,t}\left(\frac{BQ_t}{\lambda_j \omega_{s,t}}\right) \quad\forall j,t \quad\text{and}\quad E+1\leq s\leq E+S \\ &\quad\text{where}\quad \sum_{j=1}^J \sum_{s=E+1}^{E+S}\zeta_{j,s,t} = 1 \quad\forall t \end{split}\end{split}\]

Let \(\zeta_{j,s,t}\) be the fraction of total bequests \(BQ_t\) that go to the age-\(s\), income-group-\(j\) household, such that \(\sum_{s=E+1}^{E+S}\sum_{j=1}^J\zeta_{j,s}=1\). We must divide that amount by the population of \((j,s)\) households \(\lambda_j\omega_{s,t}\). The calibration chapter on beqests in the country-specific repository documentation details how to calibrate the \(\zeta_{j,s,t}\) values from consumer finance data.

Remittances

Remittances represent capital, most often currency balances, collected from ex patriots and citizens living abroad and sent back to households in the country. For most developed countries, like the United States, remittances represent an insignificant amount.[6] But for countries like the Phillipines, total incoming remittances are larger than total exports (?% of GDP in 202?).[7]

We calibrate remittances to initially be an exogenous fraction of GDP \(\alpha_{RM,0}\) but can grow from the initial period at a growth rate that differs from the endogenous growth rate of GDP and from the long-run growth rate of GDP (\(g_y + \bar{g}_n\)).

(30)\[\begin{split}RM_t = \begin{cases} &\alpha_{RM,1}Y_t \quad\text{for}\quad t=1, \\ &\left(1 + g_{RM,t}\right)RM_{t-1} \quad\text{for}\quad 2\leq t \leq T_{G1}, \\ &\left(\frac{t - T_{G1}}{T_{G2} - T_{G1}}\right)\alpha_{RM,T}Y_t + \left(1 - \frac{t - T_{G1}}{T_{G2} - T_{G1}}\right)\left(1 + g_{RM,t}\right)RM_{t-1} \:\:\text{for}\:\: T_{G1} < t < T_{G2}, \\ &\alpha_{RM,T}Y_t \quad\forall t\geq T_{G2} \end{cases}\end{split}\]

The first two lines of (30) represent the transition path of remittances before the closure rule, which are growing at a rate independent of the growth rate of the country economy. But for the steady-state to exists, total remittances must grow at the long-run growth rate of GDP before reaching the steady state. Similar to the closure rule’s described in Section Budget Closure Rule of Chapter Government, we implement a stabilizing rule that gradually transitions the growth rate of aggregate remittances from its exogenous rate through period \(T_{G1}\) to the long run economic growth rate after period \(T_{G2}\).

It is important to note that we specify the growth rate of remittances on nominal GPD as an initial percent \(\alpha_{RM,1}\), a growth rate based on those initial remittances, then a movemnt back to a rate relative to nominal GDP. This will result in stationary equations in which it matters wither the growth rate of nominal GDP \(g_{RM,t}\) is greater or less than the growth rate of labor productivity plus the population growth rate \(e^{g_y}\left(1+g_{n,t}\right)\). See equations (131) and (132) in Section Stationarized Household Equations in Chapter Stationarization.

The aggregate remittances \(RM_t\) are then distributed by the \(\eta_{RM,j,s,t}\) matrix, resulting in the value on the income side of the household budget constraint in (22).

(31)\[rm_{j,s,t} = \eta_{RM,j,s,t}\frac{RM_t}{\lambda_j\omega_{s,t}} \quad\forall \quad j,s,t\]

The distribution object \(\eta_{RM,j,s,t}\) is an \(S\times J\) matrix in every period \(t\) whose elements sum to one in every period. This object governs how total remittances in every period \(RM_t\) are distributed as income among household budget constraints.

Government transfers

Section Lump sum transfers: in chapter Government details how aggregate government transfers to households \(TR_{t}\) in every period are a percentage of total GDP. We assume here that each household’s portion of those tranfers in every period can be calibrated using the matrix of percentages \(\eta_{j,s,t}\) in every time period to allocate the transfers by a household’s lifetime income group \(j\) and age \(s\). Then the \(\eta_{j,s,t}\) allocation percentages can also vary over time \(t\).

(32)\[ tr_{j,s,t} = \eta_{j,s,t}\frac{TR_{t}}{\lambda_j \omega_{s,t}} \forall j,t, \quad\text{and}\quad E+1\leq s\leq E+S\]

These transfers to household are lump sum and only influence households’ decisions through how they change income in the budget constraint. These transfers do not include pension payments or tax credits.

is total government transfers to households in period \(t\) and \(\eta_{j,s,t}\) is the percent of those transfers that go to households of age \(s\) and lifetime income group \(j\) such that \(\sum_{s=E+1}^{E+S}\sum_{j=1}^J\eta_{j,s,t}=1\). This term is divided by the population of type \((j,s)\) households. We assume government transfers to be lump sum, so they do not create any direct distortions to household decisions. Total government transfers \(TR_t\) is in terms of the numeraire good, as shown in equation (81) in Chapter Government.

Universal basic income (UBI)

Put household universal basic income (UBI) description here.

Optimality Conditions

Households choose lifetime consumption \(\{c_{j,s,t+s-1}\}_{s=1}^S\), labor supply \(\{n_{j,s,t+s-1}\}_{s=1}^S\), and savings \(\{b_{j,s+1,t+s}\}_{s=1}^{S}\) to maximize lifetime utility, subject to the budget constraints and non negativity constraints. The household period utility function is the following.

(33)\[\begin{split}u(c_{j,s,t},n_{j,s,t},b_{j,s+1,t+1}) &\equiv \frac{(c_{j,s,t})^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma} + e^{g_y t(1-\sigma)}\chi^n_s\biggl(b\left[1 - \left(\frac{n_{j,s,t}}{\tilde{l}}\right)^\upsilon\right]^{\frac{1}{\upsilon}}\biggr) + \\ &\chi^b_j \rho_s \frac{(b_{j,s+1,t+1})^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma} \quad\forall j,t \quad\text{and}\quad E+1 \leq s \leq E+S\end{split}\]

The period utility function (33) is linearly separable in \(c_{j,s,t}\), \(n_{j,s,t}\), and \(b_{j,s+1,t+1}\). The first term is a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility of consumption. The second term is the elliptical disutility of labor described in Section Elliptical Disutility of Labor Supply. The constant \(\chi^n_s\) adjusts the disutility of labor supply relative to consumption and can vary by age \(s\), which is helpful for calibrating the model to match labor market moments. See the chapters in the Calibration section of this documentation for a discussion of the calibration.

It is necessary to multiply the disutility of labor in (33) by \(e^{g_y(1-\sigma)}\) because labor supply \(n_{j,s,t}\) is stationary, but both consumption \(c_{j,s,t}\) and savings \(b_{j,s+1,t+1}\) are growing at the rate of technological progress (see Chapter Stationarization). The \(e^{g_y(1-\sigma)}\) term keeps the relative utility values of consumption, labor supply, and savings in the same units.

The final term in the period utility function (33) is the “warm glow” bequest motive. It is a CRRA utility of savings, discounted by the mortality rate \(\rho_s\).[8] Intuitively, it signifies the utility a household gets in the event that they don’t live to the next period with probability \(\rho_s\). It is a utility of savings beyond its usual benefit of allowing for more consumption in the next period. This utility of bequests also has constant \(\chi^b_j\) which adjusts the utility of bequests relative to consumption and can vary by lifetime income group \(j\). This is helpful for calibrating the model to match wealth distribution moments. See the calibration chapter on beqests in the country-specific repository documentation for a discussion of the calibration. Note that any bequest before age \(E+S\) is unintentional as it was bequeathed due an event of death that was uncertain. Intentional bequests are all bequests given in the final period of life in which death is certain \(b_{j,E+S+1,t}\).

The household lifetime optimization problem is to choose consumption \(c_{j,s,t}\), labor supply \(n_{j,s,t}\), and savings \(b_{j,s+1,t+1}\) in every period of life to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility, subject to budget constraints and upper-bound and lower-bound constraints.

(34)\[ \max_{\{(c_{j,s,t}),(n_{j,s,t}),(b_{j,s+1,t+1})\}_{s=E+1}^{E+S}}\: \sum_{s=1}^S\beta_j^{s-1}\left[\Pi_{u=E+1}^{E+s}(1 - \rho_u)\right]u(c_{j,s,t+s-1},n_{j,s,t+s-1},b_{j,s+1,t+s})\]

(35)\[\begin{split} \text{s.t.}\quad &p_t c_{j,s,t} + \sum_{i=1}^I (1 + \tau^{c}_{i,t})p_{i,t}c_{min,i} + b_{j,s+1,t+1} = \\ &\quad (1 + r_{p,t})b_{j,s,t} + w_t e_{j,s} n_{j,s,t} ...\\ &\qquad +\: bq_{j,s,t} + rm_{j,s,t} + tr_{j,s,t} + ubi_{j,s,t} + pension_{j,s,t} - tax_{j,s,t} \\ &\qquad\text{and}\quad c_{j,s,t}\geq 0,\: n_{j,s,t} \in[0,\tilde{l}],\:\text{and}\: b_{j,1,t}=0 \quad\forall j, t, \:\text{and}\: E+1\leq s\leq E+S\end{split}\]

The nonnegativity constraint on consumption does not bind in equilibrium because of the Inada condition \(\lim_{c\rightarrow 0}u_1(c,n,b') = \infty\), which implies consumption is always strictly positive in equilibrium \(c_{j,s,t}>0\) for all \(j\), \(s\), and \(t\). The warm glow bequest motive in Equation (33) also has an Inada condition for savings at zero, so \(b_{j,s,t}>0\) for all \(j\), \(s\), and \(t\). This is an implicit borrowing constraint.[9] And note that the discount factor \(\beta_j\) has a \(j\) subscript for lifetime income group. We use heterogeneous discount factors following [Carroll et al., 2017]. And finally, as discussed in Section Elliptical Disutility of Labor Supply, the elliptical disutility of labor supply functional form in Equation (33) imposes Inada conditions on both the upper and lower bounds of labor supply such that labor supply is strictly interior in equilibrium \(n_{j,s,t}\in(0,\tilde{l})\) for all \(j\), \(s\), and \(t\).

The household maximization problem can be further reduced by substituting in the household budget constraint, which binds with equality. This simplifies the household’s problem to choosing labor supply \(n_{j,s,t}\) and savings \(b_{j,s+1,t+1}\) every period to maximize lifetime discounted expected utility. The \(2S\) first order conditions for every type-\(j\) household that characterize the its \(S\) optimal labor supply decisions and \(S\) optimal savings decisions are the following.

(36)\[\begin{split} &\frac{w_t e_{j,s}}{p_t}\bigl(1 - \tau^{mtrx}_{s,t}\bigr)(c_{j,s,t})^{-\sigma} = e^{g_y(1-\sigma)}\chi^n_{s}\biggl(\frac{b}{\tilde{l}}\biggr)\biggl(\frac{n_{j,s,t}}{\tilde{l}}\biggr)^{\upsilon-1}\Biggl[1 - \biggl(\frac{n_{j,s,t}}{\tilde{l}}\biggr)^\upsilon\Biggr]^{\frac{1-\upsilon}{\upsilon}} \\ &\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad\forall j,t, \quad\text{and}\quad E+1\leq s\leq E+S \\\end{split}\]

(37)\[\begin{split} \frac{(c_{j,s,t})^{-\sigma}}{p_t} &= \chi^b_j\rho_s(b_{j,s+1,t+1})^{-\sigma} ... \\ &\qquad+ \beta_j\bigl(1 - \rho_s\bigr)\left(\frac{1 + r_{p,t+1}\bigl[1 - \tau^{mtry}_{s+1,t+1}\bigr] - \tau^{mtrw}_{s+1,t+1}}{p_{t+1}}\right)(c_{j,s+1,t+1})^{-\sigma} \\ &\qquad\qquad\qquad \forall j,t, \quad\text{and}\quad E+1\leq s\leq E+S-1 \\\end{split}\]

(38)\[ \frac{(c_{j,E+S,t})^{-\sigma}}{p_t} = \chi^b_j(b_{j,E+S+1,t+1})^{-\sigma} \quad\forall j,t\]

The distortion of taxation on household decisions can be seen in Euler equations (36) and (37) in the terms that have a marginal tax rate \((1-\tau^{mtr})\). This comes from the expression for total tax liabilities as a function of the effective tax rate and total income as expressed in Equation (23). The expressions for the marginal tax rates and effective tax rates that emerge from the total tax liability variable \(T_{j,s,t}\) are derived in Section Effective and Marginal Tax Rates of Chapter Government.

Factor Transforming Income Units

The tax functions \(\tau^{etr,xy}_{s,t}\), \(\tau^{etr,w}_{s,t}\), \(\tau^{mtrx}_{s,t}\), \(\tau^{mtry}_{s,t}\), and \(\tau^{mtrw}_{s,t}\) are estimated in each country calibration model based on the currency units of the corresponding income data. However, the consumption units of the OG-Core model or any of its country calibrations are not in the same units as income data. For this reason, we have to transform the model income units \(x\) and \(y\) by a \(factor\) so that they are in the same units as the income data on which the tax functions were estimated.

The tax rate functions are each functions of capital income and labor income \(\tau(x,y)\). In order to make the tax functions return accurate tax rates associated with the correct levels of income, we multiply the model income \(x^I\) and \(y^I\) by a \(factor\) so that they are in the same units as the real-world income data \(\tau(factor\times x^I, factor\times y^I)\). We define the \(factor\) such that average steady-state household total income in the model times the \(factor\) equals the U.S. data average total income.

(39)\[ factor \times \Biggl[\sum_{s=E+1}^{E+S}\sum_{j=1}^J\lambda_j\bar{\omega}_s\left(\bar{w}e_{j,s}\bar{n}_{j,s} + \bar{r}_{p}\bar{b}_{j,s}\right)\Biggr] = \text{Avg. household inc. in data}\]

We do not know the steady-state wage, interest rate, household labor supply, and savings ex ante. So the income \(factor\) is an endogenous variable in the steady-state equilibrium computational solution. We hold the factor constant throughout the nonsteady-state equilibrium solution.

Expectations

To conclude the household’s problem, we must make an assumption about how the age-\(s\) household can forecast the time path of interest rates paid by firms (marginal product of capital), wages, and total bequests \(\{r_u, w_u, BQ_u\}_{u=t}^{t+S-s}\) over his remaining lifetime. As we will show in Chapter Equilibrium, the equilibrium interest rate paid by firms (marginal product of capital) \(r_t\), wage \(w_t\), and total bequests \(BQ_t\) will be functions of the state vector \(\boldsymbol{\Gamma}_t\), which turns out to be the entire distribution of savings in period \(t\).

Define \(\boldsymbol{\Gamma}_t\) as the distribution of household savings across households at time \(t\).

(40)\[ \boldsymbol{\Gamma}_t \equiv \bigl\{b_{j,s,t}\bigr\}_{s=E+2}^{E+S} \quad\forall j,t\]

Let general beliefs about the future distribution of capital in period \(t+u\) be characterized by the operator \(\Omega(\cdot)\) such that:

(41)\[ \boldsymbol{\Gamma}^e_{t+u} = \Omega^u\left(\boldsymbol{\Gamma}_t\right) \quad \forall t, \quad u\geq 1\]

where the \(e\) superscript signifies that \(\boldsymbol{\Gamma}^e_{t+u}\) is the expected distribution of wealth at time \(t+u\) based on general beliefs \(\Omega(\cdot)\) that are not constrained to be correct. [10]

Footnotes

This section contains the footnotes for this chapter.

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[1]

This functional form was originally proposed as a utility function by in a short comment by [Geary, 1950-51] that aggregates differentiated goods into a scalar utility value. It is differentiated from Cobb-Douglas utility by the subsistence consumption amount in each term of the product. This function was further developed and operationalized by [Stone, 1954].

[2]

See section Household first order condition for industry-specific consumption demand in the Derivations Chapter for the derivation of the household industry-specific consumption demand.

[3]

We can normalize the model by any of the \(I\) consumption good prices \(\tilde{p}_{i,t}\), any of the \(M\) industry-specific princes \(\tilde{p}_{m,t}\), or we could normalize the model by the composite good price \(\tilde{p}_t\). We choose to normalize by the \(M\)th industry good price \(\tilde{p}_{M,t}\) because that industry is the only one the output of which can be used as investment, government spending, or government debt. Furthermore, this nicely nests the case of one industry in which all the other industries share in consumption is set to zero \(\alpha_m=0\) for \(m=1,2,...M-1\).

[4]

Savings enters the period utility function to provide a “warm glow” bequest motive.

[5]

[Peterman, 2016] shows that in a U.S. macro-model that has only an intensive margin of labor supply and no extensive margin and represents a broad composition of individuals supplying labor—such as OG-Core—a Frisch elasticity of around 0.9 is probably appropriate. He tests the implied macro elasticity when the assumed micro elasticities are small on the intensive margin but only macro aggregates—which include both extensive and intensive margin agents—are observed.

[6]

Put citation here about remittances being small in the US and large in countries like India and the Philippines. However, we should note that populations within the US do send remittances out, making developed country remittances negative. We should include a citation about Mexican remittances through Western Union transfers.

[7]

Put citation of Philippines remittances.

[8]

See Section the mortality rate section of the calibration chapter on demographics in the country-specific repository documentation for a detailed discussion of mortality rates for the specific country calibration interfacing with OG-Core.

[9]

It is important to note that savings also has an implicit upper bound \(b_{j,s,t}\leq k\) above which consumption would be negative in current period. However, this upper bound on savings in taken care of by the Inada condition on consumption.

[10]

In Chapter Equilibrium we will assume that beliefs are correct (rational expectations) for the non-steady-state equilibrium in Section Stationary Steady-State Equilibrium Definition.